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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

* * * * * * *
CALLA E. JACKMAN,

)

Plaintiff and Appellant,

)

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

v.

)

No. 18369

DALE L. JACKMAN,

)

Defendant and Respondent.

)

* * * * * * *
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the provisions of the Decree of
Divorce dividing the marital property and awarding support.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court awarded appellant alimony in the sum
of $850.00 per month (R. J57) after determining respondent had
an annual gross income of $29,000 and a net annual income,
after taxes, of $19,600 {R. 151), a 1979 Oldsmobile, the
household furniture, fixtures and furnishings located in the
family home at 2156 Elaine Drive and the family home subject to
a $10,000 lien in favor of the respondent which was not to bear
interest or be payable until the death of the plaintiff or sale
of the home (R.156-157).

Appellant was also awarded such:

Interests, if any, as the Plaintiff has, or
may have had, in Future Development Company,
a Utah Corporation; in the Salt Lake
International Center; in any Bara
Corporation or Bara Partnership; and/or in
any profits from any of those corporations
or partnerships.
(R. 157).
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Respondent was awarded the 1980 Chrsyler LeBaron, the 1972 Ford
pick-up truck, the Kawasaki motorcycle, the office equipment
and furnishings at Baseline Appraisal (his business), the
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance policy with its cash value, the
$10,000 money market certificate at Valley Bank and Trust
Company, the $J3,500 in receivables of Baseline Appraisal, the
funds in his IRA account ($3,608.00), all right, title and
interest of the parties in Lot 84, Brown's Park Subdivision,
Bountiful, Davis County, Utah and the $10,000 lien on the
family home. {R. 156).
Respondent was ordered to pay all debts incurred by
the parties during the course of their marriage (R. 156),
$1,500.00 for the benefit of plaintiff's attorney {R. 157) and
costs of $1,066.65 {R. 179).
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmation of the trial court's
decision and an award of his costs and attorney fees on
appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appel.lant set forth a statement of facts in great
length and detail.

Respondent would accept that statement as

supplemented by the following specific additions.
Appellant takes the position that defendant had some
interest in the Salt Lake International Center, Bara
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partnerships or Bara corporations, and/or Future Development
Company.

It was over this issue that the matter went into such

extended, complex discovery and trial.

Respondent testified on

direct and cross examinat]on, repeatedly, that he had no
interest in Future Development Company, although he tried, by
every means he knew how, to raise the money or secure enough
savings from the construction to create such an interest for
himself (R.262-276, 278-280, 283-321, 345-354, 360-371,
373-383, 392, 395-6, and 404-407).

Gordon Gregson, the primary

owner of Future Development Company, testified that respondent
had no interest in Future DeveJopment Company (R. 480) as he
was never able to do what was required of him in order to
obtain such an interest (R. 48J).
Mr. Jackman further testified that he had been able to
secure no interest in any Bara entity, although he tried to do
so and documents were executed which apparently gave him such
an interest (R. 267, 321-344, 392-393, 396-398).
Finally, respondent testified that he had no interest
in any of the Salt Lake International Center partnerships (R.
371-373, 387-389, 393-395, 399-402).
The trial court found respondent had no interest in
these entities but awarded appellant all interest respondent
owned, may have owned or may ever own in those entities (R.
157).

Appellant makes this ruling the primary issue in her

-3-
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appeal.

She feels the Court should have found respondent owned

such interests awarded them to him and ordered respondent to
pay her an appropriate equalizing sum of money.

She does not

accept the ruling or award of the court and asserts this is
error - assertions presented to and not accepted by the trial
court.
The problem is probably best underscored by Judge
Banks explaining what he understood transpired and the
appellant's response thereto (R. 314).

The Court stated that

the appellant may have demonstrated inconsistent statements by
the respondent, but that did not constitute substantive
evidence of an ownership in the business entities (R.
425-427).
Respondent consistently maintained in al] testimony
and on all cross examination that he tried to obtain interests
in Future DeveJopment and various Bara entities, but was never
able to do so.

The testimony of Mr. Gregson and the failure of

appellant to produce any direct contrary evidence negate the
argument of Appellant.
Appellant also raises the issue of the court's
decision refusing to award child support.

Respondent

testified, without rebuttal, that the minor child was
emancipated and employed (R. 384).
Appellant further raises an issue as to the amount of
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alimony awarded.

Before the court were copies of the tax

returns of the parties (R. 54-102).

The testimony of the

respondent as to the income produced by Baseline Appraisal, his
sole source of earnings at the time of tria] are in accord with
the finding of the court (R.386-388, 483-494).

Respondent

testified that it took him two years to build up the
extraordinary income that appeared in 1979 (R. 261-262).
While the appellant testified that she needed $1,600
per month, she admitted that she had not been spending that sum
as she had been living and supporting herself and the minor
child of the parties on the temporary support of $1,000.00 per
month (R. 253).
ARGUMENT

I.
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULINGS, DETERMINATIONS AND
DECISIONS ARE CORRECT

This Court has repeatedly held that the trial court has an
advantaged position in considering the evidence before it, has
had the opportunity to hear witnesses testify, watch their
demeanor and view nonverba] testimony.

Thus, absent a cJear

abuse of discretion in division of the marital property and
income the trial court's determinations should be affirmed.
Turner v. Turner 649 P.2d 6 (Utah 1982); Dority v. Dority, 645
P.2d 56 (Utah 1982); Despain v. Despain, 610 P.2d 1303 (Utah
1980); Jorgenson v. Jorgenson, 599 P.2d 510 (Utah 1979).
the instant case, the wisdom of this rule is apparent.
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In

The appellant asserts error in that the trial court
allowed the respondent to hide assets from the appellant.
Counsel for respondent, throughout the pretrial proceedings and
the trial itself, constantly pointed out to the counsel for the
appellant, as well as the court, that the respondent had no
interest in any of the claimed business entities.

Respondent

not only said that he did not have these assets (if he did,
respondent would be entitled to half, and appellant wouJd be
entitled to half), but, both in comment and formal proffer, he
stated that appellant could have all interest that he might
have or ever could have in the businesses, Future Development
Company, any Bara partnership or corporation and the Salt Lake
International Center (R. l80, 191, 192-193, 313, 392, 394,
395).

The trial court and respondent, nevertheless, were

forced to endure several days of trial while appellant tried to
establish that respondent owned some hidden interest in these
entities.
Ironically, appellant even raises the point that
respondent refused a polygraph test and makes an issue of that
action but does not make a correct representation of what
occurred.

Examination of the transcript (R. 189-192)

demonstrates that respondent felt and asserted to the court
through his counsel, that if he took a polygraph test as
appellant insisted, it was because he was trying to prove he
was not lying.

This would denegate the role of the trial court
-6-
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as the finder of fact which included the issue of his veracity
(R. 189-190).

Accordingly, he made the offer that he would

take a polygraph examination if appellant, when it demonstrated
that respondent was telling the truth, would then accept the
proposed settlement made by respondent (R. 190).

This was

rejected by appellant (R. 190).
The crucial issue in this case was credibility.

This

was established at the outset of trial as an issue and remained
such throughout the trial.

This court can determine only

through examination of testimony as reported on the pages of
the transcript and the documents admitted into evidence what
occurred.

The trial court saw and heard the witnesses,

observed their demeanor and could consider their nonverbal
conduct while testifying.

That is all denied to this Court

yet it is critical to a determination of veracity and
credibility.
Respondent, throughout his testimony, stated that the
documents were correct, that they demonstrated an effort on his
part to secure an interest in some business so that he would
own a "piece of the action."

However, they also demonstrate

that he was never able to do so.

The issue of the credibility

of this testimony as well as the issue of the burden of proving
that respondent did own some interest in these business
entities was thus the major issue presented to the trial
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court.

On those questions the trial court ruled against

appellant.

She now attacks both the decision and Judge Banks,

insisting that he was sick and did not pay attention to her
evidence.

This she places in her brief but cites no authority

as this is not part of the record.
Respondent would point to four specific exchanges
which demonstrate what occurred.
Early in her testimony appellant offered, through a
written exhibit, a description of her medical history.

Counsel

for respondent agreed to stipulate to its admission as
illustrative of her testimony.

After accepting that

stipulation, appellant insisted upon going item by item through
the history and explaining it in detail (R. 221-225).

The

trial court asked the appellant to please deal with her present
medical condition as that was what was relevant but continued
to have difficulty in obtaining that information as appellant
wanted to repeat a complete history (R. 225-226) •
A similar exchange dealt with the work history of the
respondent.

The appellant tried to go through that in detail

and when the court advised counsel for the appellant that he
understood, having heard numerous condemnation actions that was
involved in the training of an MAI apprai.ser, counsel for the
appellant wanted to proceed with the historical presentation of
his case, anyway (R. 257-258).
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After all parties and the court had to sit through a
very repetitious examination, the court observed to counsel for
the appellant that he was being repetitious.

This was

acknowledged by counsel for the appellant, who kept doing so
(R.326).
The final example is the court's observation that
counsel for the appellant may have demonstrated that respondent
in some way had not told the truth in executing certain
documents or in taking actions on behalf of the businesses in
which he was trying to secure an interest but that did not
establish that he had an interest in that business.

The

colloquy between court and counsel speaks eloquently for itself
in demonstrating that this was a distinction appellant was
never able to discern (R. 425-427).

It is that failure which

produced the extensive discovery, the prolonged trial and this
appeal.
In fact, examination of the transcript demonstrates
the extreme patience of the court in allowing counsel for the
appellant to spend the better part of two days going into
matters which were totally irrelevant in order to give
appellant an opportunity to establish that the respondent had
some interest in the business entities which he denied that he
owned.

This was pursued, not in order to secure an interest of

the appellant in these properties, because that had been
offered to her repeatedly (R. 180, 191, 192-193, 313, 392, 394,
-9Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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395): it was to try to have some other property or money
awarded to the appellant.
Under these circumstances, the ability to observe the
parties, the conduct of counsel and the testimony and demeanor
of the witnesses is critical.

In order to cover her failure in

the trial court to meet that burden, appellant has chosen to
attack the tria] judge and his conduct of the trial in the
brief without making any record at the time that this was
occurring or indicating any prejudice at the time.

Now, it is

simply asserted by appel]ant, through her counsel in his brief,
not only with no support in the record, but to obfuscate the
fact that the trial court ruled correct]y on the evidence and
should be affirmed by this Court.

There is no evidence

contrary to the findings of the Court -- only appellant's
assertions.
II.
PROPERTY SHOULD BE FAIRLY AND EQUITABLY DIVIDED
BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
This court has repeatedJy held that marital property
and income should be fairly and equitably divided between the
parties.

Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 201 (Utah 1983): Turner v.

Turner, 649 P.2d 6 (Utah 1982) and authorities cited and
discussed (649 P.2d at 6).
court did so.

In the instant matter, the trial

It awarded the "disputed property" pursuant to

the proffer of respondent, fully and completely to appellant.
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Then, looking at the remaining properties and income, it
divided them fairly and equi.tably.

The most substantial asset

of the parties, their home, was awarded to the appellant.
Properties of a cumulative, slightly less value, were awarded
to the respondent.
Although the respondent received slightly less in
value than appellant, he makes no challenge to this award,
believing that it is well within the rules of fair and
equitable division established by this court.

Respondent

recognized that the only way the trial court's award could be
attacked was if this court determined that respondent, in some
way, owned interest in some other property as asserted by the
appellant.

This is not true, was never established by her, and

was continuaJly denied by respondent and by the witnesses as
called by the appellant in the presentation of her case,
particu]arly, Mr. Gregson, the principal of Future Development
Company.
The alimony award was fair.

This court has ruled

repeatedly that alimony is to maintain a spouse in as nearly as
possib]e the same condition as she was during the marriage.
is not to punish the other party nor reward a spouse.

Savage

v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983); Warren v. Warren, 655
P.2d 684, 687-698 (Utah l982); Dority v. Dority, 645 P.2d 56,
58-59 (Utah 1982).

As the trial court said in summing up
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It

• • • (T)he Court has to look at it as the
need and the ability to pay and in no
instance to I know of a justification to go
over fifty-fifty and really, wjth her
getting the home, the expenses of him being
able to live, being practical, is going to
cost him more than it is her to occupy the
house and in effect she is paying rent for
$220 a month and it's pretty hard for him to
even get a place for 220 of any practicality.
(R. 528-529.)

The court, after hearing the evidence and considering
the tax returns, found that the respondent had net income of
$19,600 a year.

That was the court's finding after hearing the

evidence as to respondent's present earnings.

The respondent

had a gross income of $29,000 and a net income of $19,600.

If

the net is divided by the 12 months of the year, it can be seen
the court determined that respondent had net income of
$1,633.33 per month and yet (violating his own declaration),
awarded slightly more than 50 percent of that, or $850.00 per
month, to the appellant.
Respondent would admit that he had earned more money
in the past and he would certainly hope that he could earn more
in the future.

His earnings in the past had come from dual

occupations -- employment plus appraisal fees.

Employment had

been terminated and he was now making his living solely by
appraisal fees at the time of trial.
Respondent had attempted to secure an interest for
himself in business by use of his skill as he did not have
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money for investment.

His efforts did not come to fruition

and, as a result, his income dropped as he had substantial
uncompensated work.

This is described in his testimony in

response to appellant's repeated questions about his interests
in the business entities, Future Development Company, the Bara
partnerships, and the Salt Lake International Center.

The

appellant, without offering any evidence of present income or
assets other than those found to exist, challenges their
division.

The assertions are without basis or merit and this

court should affirm the trial court.
III.
THE APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO ADDITIONAL
ATTORNEY'S FEES.
Counsel for the appellant testified at the conclusion of
appellant's case as to the extent of his work in preparing for
trial and in conducting the trial (R. 483-485).
than $10,000 in attorney's fees for this effort.

He sought more
The trial

court most succinctly described the situation and the request
for attorney's fees:
As to the time spent in this, I think it is
ridiculous. As to the costs incurred, I
think it's ridiculous. She is entitled to
attorney's fees.
I can't fix what you
charge her, but I can make an award toward
those attorney's fees, which I intend to do,
but they're not going to be within the realm
of what -- and the costs, the same way.
They're not going to be within the realm of
what you think you're entitled to. $10,000
attorney's fees and 15, $1,600 costs. You
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have to look at the sjtuation of what you
are able to accomplish and what was
necessary in order to do this.
(R.

527).
If anyone is entitled to attorney fees in this matter,

it would be respondent.

The appellant has taken evidence of a

series of business efforts which failed on the part of
respondent and tried to project those into successes.

When

supporting evidence was not developed, the matter was dragged
out interminably.

Attorney's fees have been incurred by

respondent who had no choice but to def end himself from what
the trial court recognized was a ridiculous attack.

It was bad

enough that this matter was so extensively tried; it was aJso
appealed.

Now appellant seeks further attorney's fees for

prosecuting this appeal.

Not only should these be denied,

respondent should be awarded his attorney's fees and costs as
incurred in this frivolous appeal.
CONCLUSION
This is a matter that has been blown out of all
proportion by the appellant.

It is a case which should have

been a simple divorce but has been expanded beyond all reason.
Eighteen depositions of people or for documents were taken (R.
109-116, 124-127, 131, 136).

Two envelopes in the record on

appeal are required to hold all of the paper exhibits in this
matter.

All of them demonstrate precisely what the respondent
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told counsel for the appellant at the beginning and throughout
the case

that the only assets held by the parties were their

home and an investment lot and some cash.

The cash,

ironically, was burned up in paying bills of the parties and
trying to handle the costs of the litigation.
This court observed in Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d
1201, 1205-1206 (Utah 1983), that to award substantial
attorney's fees decreases the property awarded to one party or
another.

Respondent, to pay his own fees has suffered this

injury.

The matter has been blown out of all proportion and

pursued to a ridiculous extent by appellant which her request
for attorney's fees clearly demonstrates.

The appellant was

awarded slightly over one-half of the net income of the
respondent and property of the parties.

He did not appeal, as

he felt the matter should be over and he could live with it.
The property was divided fairly and equitably between
the parties and the respondent accepted the fact that he would
have to pay some of the attorneys' fees and some of his
property would have to be liquidated to pay debts and
expenses.

He knew he could earn a living and more income than

appellant so he accepted the ruling as falling within the
guidelines established by this Court.
appellant is frivolous.
owned by the parties.

The appeal of the

She seeks to be awarded property never
She refuses to accept the facts as they
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exist.

Accordingly, this Court should affirm the trial court

and award the respondent both his costs and the attorney's fees
he has been forced to incur in defending this appeal.
DATED this

I

u
r-aay

of

~·

, 1983.

C[)~d~
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ

Attorney for Respondent
MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of
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the foregoing Brief have been mailed, this ~day of May,
1983, to Joel Allred, 500 American Savings Building, 61 South
Ma.in Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, attorney for
appellant.
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